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Penn Central Transportation Company v. 
New York City: Easy Taking-Clause 
Cases Make Uncertain Law
*
In Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York City,1 
the Supreme Court held that New York City’s Landmarks Preserva­
tion Law2 as applied to Grand Central Terminal was not a “ taking” 
of property for which compensation is constitutionally required. The 
decision has been hailed as a major victory for landmark preserva­
tion,3 deplored as a threat to property rights,4 and praised for clarify­
ing a confused area of legal doctrine.5 Little noticed is the fact that 
jPenn Central did not pose the hard case for landmark preservation 
law:6 a case in which preservation imposes unique and severe eco­
nomic burdens on a property owner.7 This comment argues that 
Penn Central was an “ easy case” ; the Court’s doctrinal approach to 
the taking issue in Penn Central provides uncertain guidance for 
harder cases. ,
I. P enn  C entral— O w ner  of a L andmark
Grand Central Terminal was designated a “ landmark” under 
New York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law, which allows a 
building with “special character or special historical or aesthetic 
interest” to be so designated by the Landmarks Preservation Com­
mission.8 The statute requires owners of a “ landmark” to keep its 
exterior repaired9 and to seek Preservation Commission approval for
1. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
2. New York, N.Y., Admin. Code ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0 to 207-21.0 (1971 & 1975-76 
Supps.).
3. Marcus, The Grand Slam Grand Central Terminal Decision: A Euclid for Land­
marks, Favorable Notice for TDR and a Resolution for the Regulatory/Taking Impasse, 7 
Ecology L.Q. 731, 732 (1979).
4. 438 U.S. at 143 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 25 Loy. L. Rev. 205 (1979).
5. Note, Police Power and Compensable Takings—A Landmark Decision Clarifies the 
Rules: Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 11 Conn. L. Rev. 273, 289 
(1979).
6. The exception is Soper, On the Relevance of Philosophy to Law: Reflections on 
Ackerman's Private Property and the Constitution, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 44, 62 (1979).
7. See generally Pyke, Architectural Controls and the Individual Landmark, 36 L. & 
Contemp. Prob. 398 (1971).
8. New York, N.Y., Admin. Code 207-1.0(n), quoted in 438 U.S. at 110. Designation 
can only take place after interested parties have been provided an opportunity for a hearing. 
Id. The decision is reviewed by the New York City Board of Estimate and may be reviewed 
by the courts if the owner requests. Id. at 111. Although Penn Central opposed the designa­
tion, it did not seek judicial review. Id. at 116. See generally Rankin, Operation and Interpre­
tation of the New York City Landmarks Preservation Law, 36 L. & Contemp. Prob. 366
(1971). *
9. 438 U.S. at 111.
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external alterations.10 Four months after Grand Central was desig­
nated a “ landmark,” Penn Central entered a lease agreement for the 
construction of an office tower above the terminal. Penn Central 
submitted two plans for the tower to the Preservation Commission, 
the first calling for a fifty-five story building, cantilevered above the 
terminal’s Beaux Arts facade, the second calling for a fifty-three 
story tower that would require tearing down part of the terminal, 
including the facade.11 The Commission rejected both plans as aes­
thetically wanting. Although the original 1913 plans for Grand Cen­
tral Terminal had included a twenty story Beaux Arts office tower, 
Penn Central did not consider the 1913 design, and it did not submit 
any further plans to the Commission. Penn Central did not seek 
available judicial review of the denial of the certificates, but instead 
sued to enjoin the application of the Landmarks Preservation Law 
to the terminal, claiming a “ taking” of property without compensa­
tion in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.12
The economic impact of the preservation law on Penn Central 
was moderate. Under the lease agreement for the office tower, Penn 
Central would have been guaranteed a rental of $1 million annually 
during construction and a minimum of $3 million annually after­
wards. These rentals would have been partially offset by the loss of 
existing concessions.13 The trial court found that repair and mainte­
nance costs of about $1,278,135 were necessary in 1972, and that 
Penn Central had operated the terminal at deficits of over $1 million 
in 1969 and almost $2 million in 1971.14 However, the New York 
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, holding that Penn Central had 
not been deprived of all “ reasonable use” of the property,15 found 
that Penn Central’s calculations were deficient because they attrib­
uted railroad operating deficits to the terminal, because they did 
not allow a rental value for railroad use of terminal space, and 
because Penn Central had not made adequate efforts to obtain 
rental value from underutilized terminal space.16 The New York
10. Id. at 112. The statute provides three procedures by which the Commission may 
approve alterations: 1) a certificate of “ no effect on protected architectural features” ; 2) a 
certificate of “ appropriateness” ; and 3) a certificate of appropriateness on the ground of 
“ insufficient return.”  Id.
11. Id. Penn Central applied first for a certificate of no exterior effect and then for a 
certificate of appropriateness. Id. at 116-17.
12. Id. at 118-19.
13. Id. at 116.
14. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 50 A.D.2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20, 33 
(App. Div. 1975) (Lupiano, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 28.
16. Id.
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Court of Appeals, affirming,17 reasoned that Penn Central had over­
valued its investment in the terminal by not considering the amount 
of value contributed by government subsidies, and had undervalued 
its return by not including the return to other Penn Central proper­
ties in the area, which resulted from the railroad.18 The United 
States Supreme Court concluded that Penn Central remained able 
to earn a “ reasonable return” on its investment in the terminal.19
Furthermore, the New York City statutory scheme gave Penn 
Central “ transfer development rights”20 that allow property owners 
to transfer unused development potential to contiguous lots.21 Own­
ers of landmark sites like Penn Central may transfer development 
rights to a more extended set of lots.22 At the time it sought to build 
over Grand Central Terminal, Penn Central owned a number of 
eligible recipient lots, and the lessee of the airspace over the ter­
minal was apparently willing to contract to develop one of these 
other sites.23 The Supreme Court found that these transfer develop­
ment rights to the airspace “undoubtedly mitigate whatever finan­
cial burdens the law has imposed.”24
II. T heories of the T aking  C lause
The fifth amendment guarantee, “nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation,” poses difficult 
conflicts between governmental goals and the impact of governmen­
tal action upon private property values.25 If compensation is re­
quired, governmental action may become too costly; if compensa­
tion is not required, the private landowner may bear a dispropor­
tionate share of the cost of producing a public benefit. Not surpris­
17. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42N.Y.2d324,337, 366N.E.2d 1271, 
1279, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 922 (1977).
18. 42 N.Y.2d at 333-35, 366 N.E.2d at 1276-77, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 919-21.
19. 438 U.S. at 136.
20. Transfer development rights are the subject of major controversy. See Costonis, 
"Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in 
Land Use Controversies, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1021 (1975); Note, The Unconstitutionality of 
Transferable Development Rights, 84 Yale L.J. 1101 (1975).
21. A contiguous lot, however, may not be developed more than twenty percent over 
its originally zoned maximum. 438 U.S. at 114.
22. Id. This privilege apparently was adopted to ensure that the Landmarks Law would 
not have an unduly harsh effect on Grand Central Terminal. Id.
23. Marcus, supra note 3, at 747.
24. 438 U.S. at 137. The transfer development rights, however, do not meet the “ ‘full 
and perfect equivalent’ ”  standard of compensation. 438 U.S. at 150 (Rehnquist, J. dissent­
ing) (quoting Monangahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893)).
25. See Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda­
tion of "Just" Compensation Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1967).
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ingly, courts have used a number of different theories to resolve 
taking clause questions.28 While “ essentially ad hoc”*1 adjudication 
can provide needed flexibility, commentators have deplored the 
confused state of taking clause theory.28 Some scholars have at­
tempted to reconstruct consistent themes from existing decisions.29 
Others have proposed new theoretical approaches30 that have gained 
increasing judicial attention.
A. The Appropriation Test
Courts and commentators do agree that governmental assump­
tion of title is the most obvious case of a “ taking” that requires 
compensation.31 This appropriation test has been extended to cases 
in which the government destroys property or renders it utterly 
worthless.32 For example, when the government builds a dam and 
floods land, compensation is required.33
Nearly all discussions of the taking clause agree that the com­
pensation requirement is not and should not be limited to cases in 
which the government appropriates property.34 In determining what 
additional governmental action requires compensation, however, 
theories of the taking clause diverge sharply.
26. “ [T]his Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any ‘set formula’ for 
determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require that economic injuries caused by public action 
be compensated by the government . . . 438 U.S. at 124.
27. Id.
28. Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny Co. in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court 
Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. Ct . Rev. 63, 106. See also Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 
74 Yale L.J. 36 (1964).
29. Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condem­
nation Criteria, 44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1971). See also Dunham, supra note 28.
30. Michelman, supra note 25; Sax, supra note 28.
31. See 438 U.S. at 123 n.25; United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 
155,166 (1958); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,414 (1922); Mugler v. Kansas, 
123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887); Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 595, 
350 N.E.2d 381,386,385 N.Y.S.2d 5,9-10 (1976); Lutheran Church in America v. City of New 
York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 130, 316 N.E.2d 305, 311, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7, 15 (1974). See generally F. 
B osselman, D. Callies & J. Banta, T he T aking Issue 120 (1973); Michelman, supra note 25, 
at 1184; Sax, supra note 28, at 36-37; Soper, The Constitutional Framework of Environmental 
Law, in Federal Environmental Law 20, 52 (1974).
32. Van Alstyne, supra note 29, at 7. See generally Sax, supra note 28, at 46-68; Soper, 
supra note 31, at 52.
33. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 30 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871). See also Griggs v. 
Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 89 (1962) (noise from airplane flights requiring compensa­
tion); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) (noise from airplane flights requiring 
compensation); Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 591, 350 N.E.2d
381, 383, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5,7 (1976) (limiting property use to a public park requiring compensa­
tion).
34. The exception is F. Bosselman, D. Callies & J. Banta, supra note 31, at 226-55.
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B. The Enterpriser Test
Theoretically closest to the appropriation test is Professor Sax’s 
1964 proposal extending the compensation requirement to a wider 
range of situations in which the government acts to its own benefit.35 
Sax distinguishes two governmental roles: the government acts as 
an “enterpriser” when it “ acquire[s] economic resources” ;36 it acts 
as an “ arbiter” when it settles conflicts among citizens.37 Appropria­
tion is not the only method by which the government acts as an 
enterpriser; it can also acquire resources by regulation.38 Sax argues 
that since the likelihood of arbitrary action increases when the gov­
ernment acts on its own behalf,39 courts should require compensa­
tion when the government acts as an enterpriser.40 The concept of 
government enterprise, however, may not bear the weight Sax 
places upon it. Sax argues that a taking should be found when the 
government closes gold mines, freeing skilled miners for work in 
essential war industries41 and thereby improving the government’s 
competitive ability to acquire resources on the market.42 Conversely, 
Sax would not find a taking when the government decides in favor 
of the interests of apple growers rather than owners of cedar trees,43 
or in favor of residential neighborhoods rather than quarries.44 Gov­
ernmental actions in furtherance of public goods such as defense or 
environmental protection, however, are more difficult to classify 
under Sax’s analysis.45 When the government acts to further public 
goods, it is neither settling conficts among particular private citi­
35. Sax, supra note 28, passim.
36. Id. at 62. Sax recognizes that this standard includes state collection of taxes and 
fines. Id. at 75. Rather as an afterthought, he stipulates that taxes do not raise takings clause 
issues because they do not impose burdens on isolated individuals. Id. at 75-76. Sax thus 
implicitly recognizes the importance of the fairness considerations discussed in the text 
accompanying notes 59-64 infra.
37. Id. at 62.
38. Id, at 63.
39. Id. at 64-65.
40. Id. at 63.
41. Id. at 71 (discussing United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155
(1958)).
42. “ [I]n the performance of this enterprise capacity, government is very much like 
those who function in the private sector of the economy, and indeed is in its resource- 
acquiring job a competitor with private enterprisers. . . Sax, supra note 28, at 62.
43. Id. at 69 (discussing Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928)). ■
44. Id. (discussing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) and Consoli­
dated Rock Prods, v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 
(1962)). See also Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 294 (1915) (closing a brickyard not a 
taking).
45. See Johnson, Planning Without Prices: A Discussion of Land Use Regulation With­
out Compensation, in Planning W ithout Prices 63, 102-03 (B. Siegan ed. 1970).
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zens, nor necessarily acting to enhance its own competitive position. 
Sax, himself, abandoned the government enterprise test precisely 
because he feared it would be interpreted to require compensation 
in cases involving governmental acts to acquire public goods.46 De­
spite Sax’s abandonment, however, the government enterprise test 
has gained increasing judicial recognition.47
C. The Noxious Use Test
Another approach to interpreting the taking clause is the nox­
ious use test, which provides that governmental regulation is not a 
taking if it curtails a nuisance, but that it is if it inhibits an innocent 
use.48 This theory was traditionally linked to the appropriation test 
because it rests on a formal, individualistic view of property rights: 
the owner is entitled to do what he pleases with what he owns, so 
long as he does not harm others.49 Critics of the test question 
whether there are morally relevant differences between uses classi­
fied by courts as noxious and innocent. “Noxious uses,” the critics 
claim, are not necessarily uses for which the owner is at fault or 
which violate the rights of others; rather, they are uses which are 
incompatible with other property owners’ preferred uses.50 For ex­
ample, operating a brickyard is not morally objectionable, but may 
conflict with nearby residential quiet.51 Since the moral line be­
tween noxious and innocent uses is not a significant one, the distinc­
tion does not provide a rationale for compensating an “ innocent” 
property owner who bears the costs of regulation while ignoring the 
economic plight of an owner whose “noxious use” is curtailed.
46. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 Yale L.J. 149, 150 n.5, 151
(1971).
47. See Hasegawa v. Maui Pineapple Co., 52 Hawaii 327, 475 P.2d 679, 684 n.8 (1970); 
Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124,336 A.2d 239,241 (1975); American Dredging Co. v. State Pep’t 
of Environmental Protection, 161 N.J. Super. 504, 391 A.2d 1265, 1268 (1978); Grimpel 
Assocs. v. Cohalan, 41 N.Y.2d 431, 433, 361 N.E. 2d 1022,1024, 393 N.Y.S.2d 373, 375 (1977); 
Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 593, 350 N.E.2d 381, 384, 385 
N.Y.S.2d 5, 8 (1976); Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121,128­
29, 316 N.E.2d 305, 310, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7, 14 (1974); Spears v. Berle, 63 A.D.2d 372, 407 
N.Y.S.2d 590, 593 (App. Div. 1978); Alco Parking Corp. v. City of Pittsburgh, 453 Pa. 245, 
307 A.2d 851,863 n.14 (1973); San Antonio River Auth. v. Garrett Bros., 528 S.W.2d 266,273­
74 (Tex. 1975); Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. State Dep’t of Ecology, 88 Wash. 2d 726, 565 
P.2d 1162, 1165 (1977).
48. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887).
49. See generally Sax, supra note 28, at 37-40.
50. “ A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place,—like a pig in the parlor 
instead of the barnyard.”  Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). 
See generally Michelman, supra note 25, at 1198; Sax, supra note 28, at 48-50; Soper, supra 
note 31, at 54.
51. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 294 (1915).
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. D. The Diminution of Value Test
A further concern of courts has been with the diminution in 
property values caused by regulation. The theme was sounded by 
Justice Holmes who stated that “ if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking,”52 For example, the Supreme Court held that 
compensation was required when state law prohibited subsurface 
mining which threatened a dwelling and thereby rendered a mining 
company’s retained subsurface rights valueless.53 In order to apply 
this diminution of value test, courts must specify the unit of prop­
erty for which economic loss is to be measured54 and they must 
determine when a degree of loss has become too severe to be sus­
tained without compensation.55 In the severity determination, the 
“ reasonable beneficial use” standard is commonly employed. Under 
that standard, a taking has not occurred if the owner retains some 
method of employing the property that yields an economic return, 
even if he has lost a more profitable use.56 Courts vary widely in their 
assessments of tolerable economic loss.57 They also vary widely in 
whether they consider diminution of value at all.58
E. The Fairness Test
Instead of focusing on economic loss per se, some courts and
52. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
53. Id. at 414. Pennsylvania Coal is often read as standing simply for the proposition 
that when value is diminished too greatly, compensation is required. See, e.g., F. Bosselman, 
D. Callies & J. Banta, supra note 31, at 142-48; Sax, supra note 28, at 41; Soper, supra note
31, at 56. For arguments that the case was more complex, see Costonis, supra note 20, at 1033­
34; Michelman, supra note 25, at 1230-34; Comment, Balancing Private Loss Against Public 
Gain to Test for a Violation of Due Process or a Taking Without Just Compensation, 54 Wash. 
L. Rev. 315, 327-30 (1979).
54. Sax argues that the need to individuate property interests poses an unworkable 
problem of definition for any theory of the taking clause which employs destruction or dimi­
nution of the property’s value as a criterion for a taking. Sax, supra note 28, at 60. See also 
Michelman, supra note 25, at 1192-93. But see B. Ackerman, Private Property and the 
Constitution 156-67 (1977) (arguing that “ common sense”  understandings of property can 
provide a basis for individuating “ things” ).
55. Sax, supra note 28, at 50-60; Soper, supra note 31, at 55-58.
56. The New York courts used this standard in Penn Central. See notes 15 & 17 supra.
57. Compare Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wia. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (ordinance 
limiting swamplands to indigenous uses did not require compensation) with Dooley v. Town 
Plan and Zoning Comm’n of Fairfield, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964) (zoning property 
as part of a flood plain district required compensation) and Morris County Land Improve­
ment Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963) (zoning 
restricting use of swamplands required compensation).
58. Compare Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (statute prohibiting 
mining causing dwelling subsidence was a taking) with Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 
U.S. 590 (1962) (ordinance prohibiting gravel pit excavations more than two feet below 
maximum surface water level was not a taking). •
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commentators have recently taken the view that the moral basis of 
the compensation requirement is the fairness of the imposition of 
the burden.59 In a recent discussion of fairness, Professor Michelman 
singles out two features of a burden as particularly significant for 
deciding whether compensation is required.80 The first feature is the 
burden’s uniqueness—whether it is a hardship imposed on one or a 
few individuals, or spread more widely throughout society, like a 
tax.01 The second feature is the burden’s harshness, which Michel­
man regards as a function not only of the severity of the economic 
loss that the burden imposes, but more particularly of the extent to 
which the burden upsets “ distinct investment backed 
expectation[s]”62 of the property owner. Courts have cited Michel­
man for the proposition that fairness is an important consideration 
in applying the taking clause.63 These courts were more concerned 
with general notions of fairness, however, than with Michelman’s 
two point test. Before Penn Central, only one reported decision 
appears to have considered directly the fairness of interference with 
investment-backed expectations.64
HE. Penn Central: A n  E asy Case
The Holmesian aphorism, “ hard cases make bad law,”65 poses 
a general challenge to defenders of principled judicial decisionmak­
ing. A case may be “ hard” for a legal theory if that theory cannot
59. “ ‘ [T]he Fifth Amendment’s guarantee [is] designed to bar government from 
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be 
borne by the public as a whole.’ ” 438 U.S. at 123 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 
U.S. 40, 49 (I960)).
60. Michelman, supra note 25, at 1218-24. Michelman argues that the relevance of these 
features can be explained by either a more general theory of utility, id. at 1217, or a more 
general theory of fairness such as John Rawls’s. Id. at 1219.
61. Id. at 1217.
62. Id. at 1233.
63. State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820, 825 n.16 (Alaska 1976); Midway Cabinet Fixture 
Mfg. v. County of San Joaquin, 257 Cal. App. 2d 181, 65 Cal. Rptr. 37, 44 (1968); State v. 
Nordstrom, 54 N.J. 50, 253 A.2d 163, 165 (1969); Lange v. State, 86 Wash. 2d 585, 547 P.2d 
282, 285 (1976).
64. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 521, 542 P.2d 
237, 246, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 374 (1975). In that case, investors bought land contingent on its 
being rezoned for commercial use. They failed to take advantage of the change and claimed 
a taking when the land was downzoned. The court, comparing the investors to holders of a 
losing sweepstakes ticket, did not require compensation. The notion of “ distinct investment 
backed expectations” , however, may not always be read so narrowly. If courts consider merely 
the existence of expectations, and not their reasonableness or legitimacy, the fairness test will 
require compensation in a wide range of cases.
65. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1903) (Holmes, J., dissent­
ing)-
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resolve it satisfactorily,65 quite likely because the theory’s basic 
principles point to different resolutions. A case may be “hard” for 
a judge because no legal theories apply directly or because applica­
ble legal theories conflict.67 Penn Central was an “easy” case on both 
of these counts. Predominant theories of the taking clause, with the 
possible exception of the noxious use test, resolve the case readily, 
and all compel the conclusion that compensation was not required.
Consider first the appropriation test. The city assumed no own­
ership rights over Grand Central Terminal; it did not literally 
“take” the terminal. Penn Central argued, however, that the city 
did “ take” at least some of its property: the air rights over the 
terminal. The railroad argued that the city’s denial of its certificate 
applications had rendered rights to the airspace over Grand Central 
worthless, and therefore constituted an obliteration of property akin 
to flooding from a dam.68 Justice Rehnquist was persuaded,89 but the 
majority rejected this argument, holding that a consideration of 
whether property rights have been abrogated must look to rights in 
the parcel as a whole.70 This holding raises the theoretical difficulty 
of deciding what counts as a “whole parcel” of property,71 for which 
the Court provides no guidelines. Even if this difficulty were 
avoided by granting that air rights are separate things, it does not 
follow that Penn Central suffered a “taking.” The denial of two 
certificate applications hardly constitutes full extinction of the 
value of the air rights, particularly in light of the transfer develop­
ment rights which Penn Central was granted. On the appropriations 
theory, Penn Central was clearly not entitled to compensation.
A court applying the enterpriser test would reach the same 
result. By enforcing its Landmarks Preservation Law, New York 
City did not acquire resources or improve its competitive position 
in the market. The city was not, for example, planning to purchase 
the terminal. New York City does benefit in an incidental way, of 
course, from the maintenance and preservation of tourist attrac­
tions; but this is the same manner in which private citizens in New 
York benefit from the presence of the terminal.72 Instead, Penn
66. B. Ackerman, supra note 54, at 115.
67. R. Dworkin, T aking Rights Seriously, 83-89 (1977).
68. 438 U.S. at 130. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
69. 438 U.S. at 143 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 130-31.
71. See note 54 supra. An illustration of the difficulty here is whether the railway 
station and an attached railway hotel, under common ownership and management, would 
count as the "same”  parcel.
72. To he an “ enterpriser”  under Sax’s theory, the government must benefit in a special 
and not merely an incidental way. Sax, supra note 28, at 74. Justice Rehnquist argued that
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Central involves the government acting as arbitrator between Penn 
Central’s desire to achieve profit from an office tower and other 
citizens’ desires to enjoy a familiar city vista.
The diminution of value test likewise does not entitle Penn 
Central to compensation. While Penn Central lost valuable uses of 
the property, it quite simply did not lose badly enough. The New 
York Appellate Division,73 the New York Court of Appeals,74 and the 
Supreme Court75 all found that the railroad remained able to make 
a reasonable economic return on the property. All three .courts noted 
that economically troubled Penn Central, once thwarted in particu­
larly lucrative plans, had not attempted to develop other plans such 
as the originally planned smaller tower. Nor had it tried to make 
better use of the terminal space, or tried to use its transfer develop­
ment rights.76
Finally, the fairness test similarly does not require compensat­
ing Penn Central. The burdens imposed by landmark preservation 
have been regarded as troubling with respect to fairness because 
they typically affect only those owners who happen to possess espe­
cially significant property rather than affecting—like zoning or his­
toric district legislation—all of those whose property lies within a 
specified geographic area.77 Since landmarks may stand alone or be 
widely scattered through an area, landmark preservation does not 
bring the reciprocal benefits to owners that attach to zoning or 
historic districts.78 Landmark preservation, therefore, typically im­
poses unique burdens. The Supreme Court in Penn Central, how­
ever, rejected uniqueness of the burden as a sufficient reason for 
granting compensation to Penn Central, arguing that burdens may 
be unique without requiring compensation,79 and that the Land­
marks Preservation Law may sufficiently affect the quality of life 
in New York City to provide some reciprocal benefits to Penn Cen­
the affirmative duty to maintain the landmark imposed by the statute on the landmark owner 
was similar to government acquisition of a benefit. 438 U.S. at 146 (dissenting). The govern­
ment was not, however, acquiring for free a resource which it would have needed to purchase, 
thereby improving its competitive position.
73. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
74. See note 18 supra and accompanying text,
75. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
76. 438 U.S. at 137; 42 N.Y.2d at 334, 366 N.E.2d at 1277, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 920; 377 
N.Y.S.2d at 28-29.
77. See, e.g., Pyke, supra note 7, at 398.
78. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 329-30, 366 N.E.2d 
1271,1274,397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 917-18 (1977). The benefits are reciprocal because each owner’s 
maintenance of his property benefits surrounding owners.
79. 438 U.S. at 133.
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tral.80 The Court made it clear that the fairness test requires more 
than a showing of a unique burden. The test also requires considera­
tion of the extent of interference with distinct investment backed 
expectations. Penn Central remained able to use the terminal as it 
always had;81 the investments it had made in the terminal as a 
railway station remained protected. The lease agreements were en­
tered after the city’s designation of Grand Central as a landmark; 
Penn Central had not bought land, refurbished the terminal or 
made other financial commitments aimed at developing the ter­
minal prior to the designation. While the burden’s uniqueness is 
somewhat troubling, on balance the fairness test does not require 
compensating Penn Central.
The one theory which may require compensating Penn Central 
is the noxious use test. The difficult issue here is deciding what 
counts as a noxious use.82 If maintaining an eyesore may properly 
be regarded as a noxious use, the Landmarks Preservation Law as 
applied to Grand Central would not require compensation. Justice 
Rehnquist, however, argued in dissent in Penn Central that noxious 
uses are narrowly limited to those which affect the “health, the 
morals, or the safety of the public.”83 He did not consider the some­
what speculative connection which might be drawn between land­
mark preservation, enhancing the quality of city life, and improve­
ment of public health and morals. Under Justice Rehnquist’s stan­
dard, erecting an office tower is not a noxious use, and Penn Central 
should, therefore, be compensated.
IV. T he H olding in  Penn Central and H arder C ases
The Penn Central holding rested on three central propositions. 
First, in considering whether there has been a taking, courts must 
look to the “ character of the [government] action.”84 By this, the 
Court understands most immediately whether the government acts 
as an appropriator.85 The Court, in addition, refers to the govern­
ment as acquirer of resources.88 Second, courts must take into ac-
80. Id. at 135. The latter point is speculative and probably ingenuous. Although tourism 
benefits a railroad in an obvious way, it is unlikely that any increase in tourist revenues 
generated by landmark preservation would benefit Penn Central sufficiently to offset its loss 
of revenue from the lease. Id. at 140 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 136.
82. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
83. 438 U.S. at 144 (quoting Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887)).
84. 438 U.S. at 130.
85. Id. at 130-31.
86. Id. at 128.
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count the “nature and extent of the interference”87 with the property 
owner’s ability to use his property. In considering the extent of 
interference, courts must focus particularly on the threat to 
“ distinct investment backed expectations.”88 Finally, courts must 
look to the effect on the “ parcel as a whole” rather than on particu­
lar rights in the parcel.89 The approach of the Penn Central cotirt is 
thus theoretically eclectic. It incorporates Sax’s enterpriser test, 
Michelman’s emphasis on investment backed expectations as an 
element of fairness, and dictates considering the impact of each 
with respect to complete parcels of property.90
The advantage of eclecticism is that it produces a result on 
which many would agree. The disadvantage is that it hides doctrinal 
conflict that may emerge later. Consider a “harder” version of Penn 
Central: a case in which the company was no longer able to realize 
a reasonable return on its investment or had made investments 
predicated on the possibilities of development then available, but 
later precluded by a Landmarks Preservation Law.91 The Court spe­
cifically limited its holding to the case in which Penn Central re­
mained able to “use the terminal for its intended purposes and in a 
gainful fashion” ;92 the Court’s holding does not state explicitly 
what the result would be if the terminal became an economic loss. 
In such a harder case, the criteria employed by the Court pull in 
different theoretical directions. In the harder case, the character of 
the government action would become no more that of an enterpriser 
than formerly. The enterprise test would still not award compensa­
tion. By contrast, the economic picture would have changed drasti­
cally and consideration of the fairness of the burden alone would 
dictate compensation. If the import of Penn Central is that both 
governmental enterprise and an unfair burden are necessary condi­
tions for requiring compensation, even this harder case would not 
constitute a taking. If the import of Penn Central is that either 
governmental enterprise or an unfair burden suffices for a taking,
87. Id. at 130.
88. Id. at 124.
89. Id. at 130-31.
90. The Court employed what Ackerman views as the “ lay” understanding of property 
rights. See B. Ackerman, supra note 54, at 156-67.
91. The city conceded that compensation would have been required had the terminal 
become economically unviable. 438 U.S. at 138, n.36. This “ hard case”  is a realistic one for 
landmark preservation. Landmarks are likely to be in older, decaying areas of towns. See 
generally Pyke, supra note 7. Attempts to increase economic value by such schemes as 
transfer development rights are contingent on market conditions in the area. See generally 
The Unconstitutionality of Transferable Development Rights, supra note 20.
92. 438 U.S. at 138, n.36.
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compensation will be required in the harder case.
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, recently 
applied Penn Central to a harder case, and found that compensation 
was required. In Spears v, Berle,03 plaintiffs leased property for the 
purpose of mining sand. The property was classified as wetlands, 
and a permit was required for commercial use.94 When plaintiffs’ 
application for a commercial use permit was turned down, they 
argued that they had been deprived of all beneficial use of the 
property.95 Applying Penn Central, the court found that plaintiffs 
were entitled either to a permit or to compensation.96 The court’s 
reasoning illustrates how Penn Central provides uncertain guid­
ance. First, the Spears court reasoned that wetlands regulation in­
volves governmental enterprise.97 In this argument, the court ana­
lyzed wetlands regulation as government action for public good 
rather than government enhancement of its own resource position; 
the court’s opinion thus illustrates how the concept of “ government 
enterprise” may be extended to include governmental action for 
public goals.98 Second, the Spears court relied heavily on the harsh­
ness of the burden, noting that “ [t]he analogy to landmark preser­
vation is a strong one, except that the burden on the wetlands owner 
is likely to be greater than on one who owns a structure designated 
as a landmark since the structure may be of some economic value.” 89 
Because the Spears court relied on an extended notion of 
“enterprise,” it did not clearly differentiate the implications of the 
enterprise and fairness tests in this case. The court did appear to
93. 63 A.D. 372, 407 N.Y.S.2d 590 (App. Div. 1978).
94. Id. at 591. The controversies generated by wetlands regulation are similar to those 
generated by landmark preservation. Cases upholding wetlands regulation without requiring 
compensation to injured property owners include Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Fran­
cisco Bay Conservation and Dev. Comm’n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970); 
Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221,284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert, denied, 
409 U.S. 1108 (1973); Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124, 336 A.2d 239 (1975); Just v. Marinette 
County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). Cases holding wetlands regulation invalid 
without compensation include Bartlett v. Zoning Comm’n of Old Lyme, 161 Conn. 24, 282 
A.2d 907 (1971); State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970); Morris County Land Improve­
ment Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
95. Spears v. Berle, 63 A.D.2d 372, 407 N.Y.S.2d 590, 591 (App. Div. 1978). Without a 
permit, plaintiffs were limited to these uses: recreational or commercial fishing, shellfishing, 
aquaculture, hunting, trapping, watering and grazing livestock, making reasonable use of 
water resources, harvesting natural products, selectively cutting timber, and draining for 
agricultural purposes. Id.
96. Id. at 595.
97. Id. at 593. But see American Dredging Co. v. State Dep’t of Environmental Protec­
tion, 161 N.J. Super. 504, 391 A.2d 1265,1268 (1978) (wetlands regulation not governmental 
enterprise under Penn Central).
98. See notes 45 & 46 supra and accompanying text.
99. Spears v. Berle, 63 A.D.2d 372, 407 N.Y.S.2d 590, 594 (App. Div. 1978).
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find that the harsh burden itself warranted compensation,100 and 
thus may have interpreted Penn Central to mean that either the 
government’s acting as an enterpriser or unfairness alone warranted 
compensation.
Defenders of landmark preservation, wetlands regulation, and 
other legislation with potentially harsh effects on property values 
ought not, therefore, to take too sanguine a view of Penn Central. 
The moral considerations which support the disjunctive, weaker 
interpretation of Penn Central are powerful. The argument for re­
garding enterprise alone as sufficient to warrant compensation is 
that the government ought to pay for advantages it acquires and 
that arbitrary governmental action should be discouraged. The ar­
gument that unfairness alone should require compensation is that 
it is wrong to pursue even very important public goals by methods 
which impose disproportionate burdens on a few property owners.
In defense of the stricter reading of Penn Central, requiring 
both governmental enterprise and an unfair burden for compensa­
tion, more can be said than that landmark preservation is an impor­
tant value and that unless action is taken, irreparable damage to 
landmarks will result. The stricter reading defers more extensively 
to legislative judgment. It recognizes a taking only in the clearest 
cases of arbitrary action, when the government has both gained 
benefits for itself and imposed especially unfair burdens on the pri­
vate owner. Courts and commentators have recommended judicial 
deference to the legislature in the area of landmark preservation 
because of the moral conflicts involved101 and because legislatures 
are more able to adopt flexible compromises among competing val­
ues.102 Transfer development rights are an example, and Penn 
Central reflects the Court’s respect for such legislative accommoda­
tion.103
A final argument for judicial deference to the legislature with 
respect to landmark preservation is the relative novelty of issues 
such as environmental or historical preservation. Although preser­
vation is increasingly recognized as a value,104 discussions of the
100. Id.
101. Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1061 (5th Cir. 1975) (Vieux Carre 
preservation ordinance not a taking); cf. Sax, supra note 28, at 175 (legislatures and adminis­
trative agencies as increasingly able to analyze costs and benefits when resource uses con­
flict).
102. Costonis, supra note 20, at 1049, 1076; Michelman, supra note 25, at 1253-56.
103. 438 U.S. at 137.
104. See Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1060 (5th Cir. 1975). Congress 
has adopted landmark preservation as a policy. National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 
§§ 1, 101-108, 201-212, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-70t (1976).
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moral basis for landmark preservation are as yet speculative.105 Tra­
ditional theories of property rights simply do not address the ques­
tion of whether property owners are obligated to use their land in 
ways which preserve historical, cultural, or environmental values.105 
The taking clause is generally thought to raise problems of compen­
satory justice, of whether someone has suffered deprivation of an 
existing compensable right. Such compensatory determinations are 
appropriate subjects for judicial resolution. If our moral and politi­
cal orientations do not yet encompass resolutions for conflicts be­
tween property values and historical, cultural or environmental val­
ues, then landmark preservation may be better regarded as a prob­
lem of how to distribute rights and resources—as a problem of dis­
tributive justice. Distributive questions arguably are the province of 
the legislature rather than the courts. Courts should, therefore, 
adopt the strict reading of Penn Central and require compensation 
only in the clearest cases of arbitrary governmental action.
L eslie P ickering F rancis
105. See, e.g., Golding & Golding, Why Preserve Landmarks? A Preliminary Inquiry 
in Ethics and Problems of the 21st Century 175 (1979). Sax simply asserts, without argu­
ment, that the public has “rights”  to a vista. Sax, supra note 28, at 162.
106. See, e.g., J. Locke, T he Second T reatise of Government §§ 25-51 (P. Laslett ed. 
1960). •
A
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